9/11 Commission Misses NSC's Purpose

The ink on the Report from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, a/k/a the "9/11 Commission," had yet to dry before one error by the commissioners became painfully clear. In calling for a single intelligence chief, it forgot that America had one. Of course, the fact that she hasn't done her job very well makes it difficult for anyone to say that Condoleeza Rice is America's intelligence chief. However, under the National Security Act of 1947 and based on precedent, especially during the Eisenhower years, Dr. Rice should have taken on the role the commissioners say America needs. Of course, she is also a former Sovietologist who missed the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Harry Truman never really liked the National Security Council, but Ike loved it. According to the White House website, "Under President Eisenhower, the National Security Council system evolved into the principal arm of the President in formulating and executing policy on military, international, and internal security affairs." Also, "Under President Eisenhower, the National Security Council system evolved into the principal arm of the President in formulating and executing policy on military, international, and internal security affairs."

Finally, "The Council consisted of the five statutory members: the President, Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense, and Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization. Depending on the subject under discussion, as many as a score of other senior Cabinet members and advisers, including the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the JCS, and the Director of Central Intelligence, attended and participated. The agenda included regular briefings by the Director of Central Intelligence on worldwide developments affecting US security, and consideration of the policy papers advanced by the Planning Board."

That America has too many intelligence groups (15 at last count) is a given. However, creating a single agency prevents the rivalry that keeps organizations on their toes (monopoly in public agencies is no better than private sector monopoly). So, coordination and diminution of inter-agency friction is vital, and clearly wasn't done in advance of the Al-Qaeda murders. However, the precedent is there, forty plus years old, but there nonetheless.

As the White House website determines, "The strength of the NSC system under Eisenhower was that it provided for regular, fully-staffed, interagency review of major foreign and national security issues, culminating in discussion and decision at the highest level of government." The commissioners can redraw the organizational chart all they want, but the fact remains that the NSC under the Bush administration hasn't been used very effectively, and the National Security Advisor failed to make it function. Sometimes, the problem isn't the institution but the people in it.


© Copyright 2004 by The Kensington Review, J. Myhre, Editor. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written consent.


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