No More Excuses in Reforming American Intelligence

On September 11, 2001, the United States intelligence community was caught napping. The result was 3,000 dead. Some of the blame for that failure lies in the people who worked in American intelligence. And some of it was institutional. For three years, the Bush administration has avoided dealing with these shortcomings. Initially, there was resistance to act because that is the modus operandi of the Yosemite Sam White House. Then, the 9/11 Commission (which the Bush crowd opposed creating) had to make its report before sensible action could be taken. Lastly, the election kept all of official Washington pre-occupied. The hour is late, and Mr. Bush needs to act. He only has four more years, and at the glacial pace his staff are moving, it may not be enough time.

The problem comes not from Democrats, who were so soundly thrashed in the election that they may not even oppose bad ideas, but rather from Mr. Bush’s fellow Republicans. The Congress is dealing with different bills to reform the American intelligence community. The major bone of contention is an inside-the-beltway issue – who’s going to oversee the new intelligence order. The House of Representatives has a bill that backs the Pentagon, which currently controls 80% of American intelligence spending. Meanwhile, the Senate would create a National Intelligence Director outside the Pentagon structure.

Backing the Senate approach would require Mr. Bush to rein in Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Opponents of the idea, and by default Mr. Rumsfeld’s supporters, say that the creation of a position liker Director of National Intelligence would create confusion in the 15 intelligence agencies of the US government. During war time, that is hardly wise. And of course, by changing, Mr. Bush would tacitly be admitting that his set up on September 10 was insufficient and weak. Mr. Bush views confessing to mistakes to be a sign of weakness. The preferred White House leadership model is General George Armstrong Custer.

Add to this mess the arrival of Porter J. Goss as new Director of Central Intelligence. A new DCIA is a challenge anytime. Right now, it is doubly so. Mr. Goss has come in with a new broom to sweep the CIA clean. His particular target is the Directorate for Operations, the clandestine part of the CIA. Four former deputy directors for operations have tried to speak with him on the matter. They don’t appear to mind changes, but rather, they object to Mr. Goss’ rather school marmish approach. The four staffers he brought with him from Capitol Hill when he left congress are viewed as inexperienced and not very sharp about intelligence matters. For his part, Mr. Goss has claimed that there is “too much management at headquarters.” He also has said change requires “sometimes, very blunt, strong language. I don't like doing it — I call it tough love — but I think occasionally you have to do that." The guys with 30 years experience in black ops are certain to love that idea.

None of this is particularly lethal to America’s national security so long as it doesn’t go on for much longer. Mr. Bush will eventually just have to make a decision and stick with it. Only time will tell if it is right or wrong. There is no doubt that he is capable of sticking with a decision he has made. He just needs to get on with it. And if he does happen to cut Donald Rumsfeld out of intelligence activities, he would deserve immense praise for his vision.


© Copyright 2004 by The Kensington Review, J. Myhre, Editor. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written consent.


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