US Airport Security No Better Than before Al Qaeda Attacks

Two reports on US airport security are due out this week, but they were leaked all over the week-end papers. The Government Accountability Office and the Heimatschutzministerium (Department of Homeland Security in the original) have independently investigated security at US airports since the country spent billions on improving air traffic safety following the loss of the World Trade Center and part of the Pentagon. It turns out that for all the good it did, the US should have burned the money -- the flying public is no better off than before the attacks.

Since Uncle Sam took over the screening operations at US airports after the attacks, the Transport Security Administration has taken on 45,000 workers, all for naught. In January, the acting (the Bush administration hasn't bothered with confirmation here as in so many other positions) General Inspekteur des Himatschutzministeriums, Richard Skinner, testified under oath, "the ability of TSA screeners to stop prohibited items from being carried through the sterile areas of the airports fared no better than the performance of screeners prior to September 11, 2001." No much wiggle room there, and it echoed Clark Kent Ervin, Mr. Skinner's predecessor (who somehow did get confirmed), who said a year ago that privately contracted workers and TSA screeners "performed about the same, which is to say, poorly."

Naturally, this information has turned into a political football. Peter DeFazio (D-OR), ranking Democrat on the aviation subcommittee in the House of Representatives, said, that the problem is with the equipment. The screeners won't be up to snuff "until these people have state-of-the-art technology." The Democrats remain committed to overcoming problems by throwing good money after bad.

Which isn't to say the GOP has it right either. John Mica (R-FL) and chairman of the aviation subcommittee, claims the problem is an ideological issue. "A lot of people will be shocked at the billions of dollars we've spent and the results they're going to see, which confirm previous examinations of the Soviet-style screening system we've put in place." He also complained about privacy concerns that hampered security procedures. Now, one could say many things about Aeroflot before the death of communism that are unflattering, but lack of security was never an issue, and privacy wasn't a hallmark of the USSR. Mr. Mica's solution, an ideologically driven one, is to have private contractors handle screening. Unfortunately, the facts suggest that would be a bad idea. The screeners who failed their country that September morning worked for private contractors.

Airport security, of course, is nonsense. Short of making the airports into air force bases under military law, there is no way to make them secure. The now forgotten shooting at LAX near the El Al ticket counter occurred outside the sterile areas. The ticket counter is as secure as a strip mall, and since it is a retail area, one can't expect much more. Where the security effort should have been placed was in making the airplane cockpits impregnable, placing armed air marshalls on every flight, and in intelligence operations against terrorist cells. Instead, Uncle Sam took Aunt Agatha's nail file away before she came to visit. Creating long lines at airports and making everyone take their shoes off may have made it look like things were being done to improve security, but in fact, it was all smoke and mirrors. The GAO and the Heimatschutzministerium agree on that. Of course, no one is going to lose a job over this.


© Copyright 2005 by The Kensington Review, J. Myhre, Editor. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written consent.
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