What Lord Butler Saw

16 July 2004



Butler Report Blames No One for Intelligence Failures

Lord Butler's report on the failings of the British intelligence community in the period preceding the attack on Iraq came to a very British conclusion. In essence, it says, "mistakes were made, no one is responsible for making them, and the country ought to just move on." The real question, of course, was beyond the remit of the report: "Did the Blair government decide on war first and then use the intelligence services to provide a pretext?"

The report offers something for everyone. For those who claim that the war was a bad idea based on bad intelligence, "The JIC [Joint Intelligence Committee] should not have included the ‘45 minute’ report [the assertion that Iraq could launch a chemical attack in 45 minutes using weapons no one can find] in its assessment and in the Government’s dossier without stating what it was believed to refer to. The fact that the reference in the classified assessment was repeated in the dossier later led to suspicions that it had been included because of its eye-catching character" [ Butler Report, p.156] And, Vice President Cheney, please note, "The JIC made clear that, although there were contacts between the Iraqi regime and Al Qaida, there was no evidence of co-operation" [ibid.]

On the other side, "We recommend no change in the JIC’s membership" [p.159.] Moreover, "We consider that it was reasonable for the JIC to include in its assessments of March and September 2002 a reference to intelligence reports on Iraq’s seeking mobile biological agent production facilities" [ibid.]. And "We were impressed by the quality of intelligence assessments on Iraq’s nuclear capabilities" [p.153].

However, the question in both the US and the UK is not how did the intelligence communities get it wrong. Governments get bad intelligence all the time -- e.g., the total surprise at Langley when the Soviet Union went out of business. Rather, as Leader of the Liberal Democrats Charles Kennedy, MP, asked, "What was the key reality of the political judgment that led the country to war?" Or as he put it differently, "We argued that we wanted the political judgments which informed the decision to go to war placed under the microscope." That wasn't done by Lord Butler or the Senate Committee (yet).

The Opposition Leader Michael Howard, MP, tried his best to damage Mr. Blair by saying, "The prime minister has said mistakes were made and he accepts responsibility, but it is not a question of responsibility but credibility." The trouble with Mr. Howard's statement is that he and his Conservative Party voted with the government for war. Mr. Kennedy's party did not -- and won a previously safe Labour seat in Leicester South in yesterday's by-election. When the general election comes, sometime in the next twelve months, there may be a surprise ahead when the British electorate are reminded just who back the war of bad intelligence, regardless of the good faith shown at the time.


© Copyright 2004 by The Kensington Review, J. Myhre, Editor. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written consent.


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