Samba Bomba

6 October 2004


Brazil Takes Hardline on Inspections of Its Uranium Enrichment

Secretary of State Colin Powell spent yesterday in Brazil, rather out of season, so one can only conclude he was there for business. When it comes to Brazil’s nuclear energy program, the Americans say they want to see to the business of nuclear non-proliferation. The Brazilians seem to think the Americans want to see to the business of intellectual property theft. Mr. Powell came home empty handed, and the American media were oddly silent.

Back in 1976, when Brazil was misruled by the military, the nation began a uranium enrichment program ostensibly to fuel a nuclear-powered submarine the Brazilian navy planned to build. Eleven years later, the news of a successful enrichment process hit the papers in Brazil. Political priorities shifted, and the people voted, and the program got moved to the back burner. Now, President Lula da Silva’s government wants to enrich uranium at the Resende enrichment facility, about 100 miles from Rio de Janiero, for the nation’s two nuclear power plants.

The Brazilians have allowed IAEA inspectors in, but they get all fussy and snippy when the inspectors try to check the centrifuges. The government claims the centrifuges use a magnetic suspension technology that uses only 5% of the energy America’s mechanically suspended centrifuges require. Perhaps. If so, there is nothing in the inspection regime that would require the Brazilians to disclose their technological breakthrough. They have placed a set of panels around the centrifuge while leaving the pipes that bring material in and out of the centrifuge exposed. Those panels are the problem according to the IAEA, and the Americans.

The US and IAEA claim that Brazil’s reluctance to allow full access sets a bad precedent. Iran and North Korea are far less cooperative, but any appearance that the Brazilians are getting away with something will influence how those nations respond to inspection requests. Quite possibly.

What is significant in support of the Brazilian argument is that there is no unaccounted for uranium in their system. Not a gram. And here is the big difference between Brazil and the other two. No one outside the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs knows how much uranium is missing, being enriched for military purposes or has been sold to freelance terrorists. A solution is simple enough; unless there is a corporate espionage twist to all of this, allow Brazil to hide whatever is wants so long as the government can account for every bit of fissionable material.

© Copyright 2004 by The Kensington Review, J. Myhre, Editor. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written consent.

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