Iran Signals Rejection of Nuke Offer

Despite promises that the official reply is coming tomorrow, Iran has made sure that its rejection of the West’s offer on its nuclear program surprises no one. The Iranian military is holding war games covering half the country, it has launched short-range missiles in a “test,” and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on Monday, “The Islamic Republic of Iran has made its decision and, in the issue of nuclear energy, will continue its path powerfully.” If tomorrow, the Iranians accept the deal, it will be the greatest mis-direction in recent diplomatic history.

Now, the truth is that the Iranians will neither accept nor reject the deal. Rogue states (what one might have called “revisionist powers” a few years ago) benefit most from diplomacy when they engage in splitting the difference, repeatedly. A senior official in Iran told Reuters anonymously, “Our answer cannot be a comprehensive answer as this proposal has many basic problems.” If that isn’t an opening gambit in a new round of diplomacy, what is?

Moreover, since the West has given Iran until August 31, a response tomorrow that doesn’t outright reject the economic and political gift basket offered in exchange for a halt to researching a Persian Bomb would have nine days of refinements and discussion before the West did anything. The United States, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany presented the package in June, and they have threatened to return to the UN Security Council for sanctions if the package is rejected. But will they?

Russia and China have a veto in the UNSC, and to be honest, they have very little reason to stop the Iranians from pursuing a fission bomb. While it would complicate the security considerations of both Moscow and Beijing, it sends Washington into hissy fits that are more than worth that aggravation to Messrs. Putin and Hu. If Tehran gives a “yes and no” answer, it is likely to succeed in splitting the UNSC members, and any sanctions resolution will be watered down to the point of being meaningless, or there will be a veto.

The West needs to understand that The Bomb is as much a matter of domestic politics as it is international security with Iran. People who don’t like the mullahs and their misguided regime still accept the line that Iran is not being treated with respect by the great powers of the world, and that Iran’s development of a nuclear bomb will force them to do so. It is probably impossible to prevent Iran from joining the nuclear weapons club without sending hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of troops into the country – airpower, as demonstrated in Lebanon by Israel, doesn’t get the job done. A better strategy would be to admit, at least among the western powers, that it can’t be stopped and to tailor a policy to deal with that reality. Deterrence coupled with negotiations worked with the Soviet Union.

At the heart of the matter, it isn’t possession of The Bomb that is the problem. It is the desire to use it. If the will to destroy doesn’t exist, the arsenal doesn’t matter. If the desire is strong, a nation will use any weapon it can get, nuclear or conventional. That isn’t to say that the west must coddle Iran, but discussions between rivals (enemies?) don’t mean weakness, but rather they prove wisdom.

© Copyright 2006 by The Kensington Review, Jeff Myhre, PhD, Editor. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written consent. Produced using Fedora Linux.

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