Best Case Scenario

15 November 2006



Blair’s Guildhall Speech Expects Too Much from Iran, Syria

Prime Minister Tony Blair made his last Guildhall speech as top dog in Britain on Monday. Looking not-quite-James-Bond in white tie and tails, he laid out the new British policy in the Mid-East, which was set by voters in New York, Indiana and Montana. He believes that a rapprochement with Iran and Syria could lead to a settlement of the Iraq-Nam mess. This is best-case scenario thinking at its worst. Iran and Syria can’t force anyone in Iraq to do anything, and even if they could, Mr. Blair’s approach begs the question of whether either would want to settle affairs in Mesopotamia.

Looking at Syria first, tens of thousands of Iraqi exiles are there, many the elite of the Saddamite regime. They are actively funding the insurgents/terrorists/freedom-fighters among the Sunni. Offending guests with money doesn't really help Damascus. Recall also that the Syrian regime was openly targeted in Washington as ripe for change, the awful business school term “low hanging fruit” was used. Moreover, having been bounced out of Lebanon by pressure from the people there supported by the West, the Ba’athists in Damascus have reason enough to be difficult if not impossible.

On the other side of Iraq lies Iran, a nation with even less reason to cooperate. The current president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is a knuckle dragging reactionary who would have done well as a member of the SS or Mussolini’s court. His very position requires him to kick sand at Uncle Sam every chance he gets. He has been very successful in distracting the Iranian people from their economic troubles by railing at Israel, the US and anyone else he can think of to blame for the failings of the mullahs who own and operate Iran, Inc. Making nice with the “Great Satan” would undermine his position and that of his backers in the clergy. It won’t happen.

Moreover, the belief that the Iraqi militias can be controlled by Damascus and Tehran is mistaken. Much of the trouble visited upon the Iraqi people stems from the perception that they will do as they’re told and that they will like it. The truth is no people on this planet will put up with that kind of treatment for long. Damascus and Tehran can cut off money, weapons and food, but so what? Guerrilla forces, and that’s what the 23 militias (at least) in Iraq are, can survive and function without external support so long as the people support them. Thus far, there is no evidence that the various militias have lost support within their various communities.

A further point is the Syrian-Iranian relationship. There is no reason to believe that these two regimes (one secular fascist, the other religiously oppressive) would cooperate with one another. Most Iranians are Persian, while most Syrians are Arabs. One would be mistaken to presume they are identical in their views of the world. Most Syrians are Sunni, but their governing regime is largely Alawite (a branch of Shi’ism, distinct from the Iranian variety). Any policy that hinges on them agreeing may be doomed from the beginning.

As the Iraq Study Group prepares its final report, which will almost certainly discuss Syria and Iran as participants in the ultimate solution to the Iraqi question, one must consider the realists’ belief that everything is negotiable. This is the blind spot in this paradigm, just as "culture doesn’t matter" was one of the many flaws in neo-conservatism. It is quite possible that Iran and Syria don’t want to help Washington and London fix Baghdad at any price.

© Copyright 2006 by The Kensington Review, Jeff Myhre, PhD, Editor. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written consent. Produced using Fedora Linux.


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