Dead on Arrival

8 December 2006



Iraq Study Group Issues Report

The Iraq Study Group, led by James A. Baker III and Lee Hamilton, issued its report Wednesday around 11 am Eastern time. Before the White House staff could serve luncheon, the thing was already collecting dust. While there was much in the report that might be helpful (not least a relatively realistic assessment of the Mess-opomatia), the president and his team have refused to embark on a vital proposal, “The New Diplomatic Offensive.” This essentially consigned the report to the shelf before the ink has had a chance to dry.

The report was largely a Three-Card Monte trick in reviewing the options for American policy Iraq-Nam. Straw men and overly simplistic descriptions forced one to write off perfectly plausible approaches. It debunked the option of leaving Iraq-Nam as quickly as possible by labeling it “precipitate withdrawal.” The adjective is pejorative in government circles. Had it been called “rapid redeployment” or even “prompt withdrawal,” one might believe that the option had been seriously discussed by the members of the ISG; it wasn’t. Sending more troops was given similar short shrift, “America’s military capacity is stretched thin: we do not have the troops or equipment to make a substantial, sustained increase in our troop presence.” Meanwhile, “staying the course” got vetoed because it clearly isn’t working. Trisection of the nation into a Kurdistan, Shiastan and Sunnistan was deemed not in America’s interest, and so was not taken seriously. Yet, it may be the ultimate outcome.

The ISG (which will forever be confused with the Iraq Survey Group sent to look for nonexistent weapons of mass destruction after the fall of the Saddamite regime) recommended reducing US troop levels by embedding them within the Green Zone government’s military structure and getting out of the direct combat business. At the same time, “The New Diplomatic Offensive” was the name given to an effort to get the international politics of the area moving – if successful, the plan would result in America largely getting out of Iraq-Nam by March 2008 (just in time for the presidential primaries). Since Iran and Syria are part of the neighborhood, and since they are heavily involved in the internal politics of Iraq, they were included in the proposed negotiations. The authors of the report noted several difficulties related to this, but they believed (somewhat optimistically) that Damascus and Tehran had more to gain than to lose by engaging in talks.

The report’s authors forgot, however, about the stubbornness of the president when it comes to talking to those he doesn’t like. Mr. Bush said, “Countries that participate in talks must not fund terrorism, must help the young democracy survive, must help with the economics of the country. If people are not committed, if Syria and Iran is [sic] not committed to that concept, then they shouldn’t bother to show up.” Syria and Iran have resisted preconditions for months if not years, and they both know they have strong hands to play against Mr. Bush’s busted flush. Letting him twist in the wind for a few more months will not bother either of them.

Without a meaningful diplomatic effort, without getting a political settlement or motion toward one, the US military efforts are wasted. The report also said, “As another American general told us, if the Iraqi government does not make political progress, ‘all the troops in the world will not provide security’.” The Iraqi government cannot make that progress in a vacuum. Negotiations are fundamental to success of the plan.

The report is probably as good an assessment of the situation as one can have. Still, it is overly optimistic about America’s ability to affect anything anymore in Iraq-Nam. If followed, more American lives will be lost in pursuit of a goal that probably has not been achievable in over two years. Still, it offers something more than the non-strategy by which the White House was implementing a non-policy. In that sense, “Mission Accomplished.” But since the Busheviks refuse to budge on its primary engine of action, the plan is “dead on arrival.”

© Copyright 2006 by The Kensington Review, Jeff Myhre, PhD, Editor. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written consent. Produced using Fedora Linux.


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