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Blair Chastised by Brit Think Tank over Iraq “Mistake”
The Royal Institute of International Affairs, known more affectionately as “Chatham House,” has issued a report by its director Professor Victor Bulmer-Thomas OBE, called, “Blair’s Foreign Policy and its Possible Successor(s).” It is both a fair assessment of Mr. Blair’s foreign policy, and a damning critique of his Iraq-Nam policy. More troubling, though, is the damage that the good professor says has been done to the Anglo-American special relationship.
As with politics in general, it hasn’t all been bad under Tony Blair. In the early days, Professor Bulmer-Thomas notes that the hand over of Hong Kong to the Communists in China went off without a blood bath. The signing of the Amsterdam Treaty, the entry into UK law of the European Charter of Human Rights, and the cooperation with France over the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) are all milestones, according to the report. The Kosovo campaign counts as a success. “By the time of his second election victory in June 2001, Tony Blair could look back on his foreign policy with some satisfaction,” the report says.
Also, Mr. Blair earns rave reviews for his African policy. “The focus on Africa as the prime candidate for Britain’s growing programme of official development assistance seems certain to stay. The public is comfortable with it and there is cross-party support.” Above all, there is climate change: “The most positive part of Blair’s legacy in foreign affairs will be climate change policy. While it is easy to criticize the gap between his rhetoric and government actions at home in mitigating climate change, there is no doubt that Blair’s powers of persuasion have been very effective in pushing this issue up the international agenda.”
Nonetheless, Iraq-Nam is the “terrible mistake” that will likely be the key historical issue of UK foreign policy under Mr. Blair. Professor Bulmer-Thomas writes, “in close cooperation with US Secretary of State Colin Powell, the decision was made to emphasize the need to eliminate Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction.”
In hindsight, we can see that this was a terrible mistake. Was it a mistake at the time? The jury is still out on the extent to which Blair knew that the claims about WMD were overblown or even fabricated. What is clear is that the decision to commit British troops to the invasion of Iraq in the absence of a UN Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force drove a horse and cart through the ‘doctrine of international community’ he had proclaimed in his Chicago speech. Britain was not sure of its case (witness the Attorney-General’s altered advice on the legality of war); the diplomatic options had not been exhausted (Hans Blix was calling for more time for the UN weapons inspectors); and the national interest was not truly engaged (even if Saddam Hussein had WMD, they were not directed at the United Kingdom). Under these circumstances, the only thing that could have rescued Tony Blair was a swift and successful establishment of a democratic government in Iraq, and that did not happen.
Mr. Blair’s calculation all along was that by backing the Busheviks he gained some ability to influence them. In that, he seems not to have understood what Mr. Bush means by “ally,” which is “someone who does what the American president wants.” The report reads:
The root failure, however, has been the inability to influence the Bush administration in any significant way despite the sacrifice – military, political and financial – that the United Kingdom has made. There are two possible explanations: either the accumulated political capital was not spent wisely or the capital was never as great as was supposed. The latter now looks the most probable explanation, although anecdotal evidence also suggests that the prime minister did not make full use of the opportunities that were presented to him. Given the Byzantine complexity of Washington politics, it was always unrealistic to think that outside powers – however loyal – could expect to have much influence on the US decision-making process. The bilateral relationship with the United States may be ‘special’ to Britain, but the US has never described it as more than ‘close’. The best that could be hoped for is that Britain would ally itself with one of the Washington factions that ultimately prevailed in the internecine struggle for presidential support. Tony Blair has learnt the hard way that loyalty in international politics counts for very little. His successor(s) will not make the same mistake. For the foreseeable future, whoever is prime minister, there will no longer be unconditional support for US initiatives in foreign policy. Nor will it make much difference who is in power in the United States.
Professor Bulmer-Thomas has written an accurate assessment of the Blair years that is, sadly, a eulogy for the transatlantic special relationship.
© Copyright 2006 by The Kensington Review, Jeff Myhre, PhD, Editor. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written consent. Produced using Fedora Linux.
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