“Joint Campaign Plan” Will Have GIs Dying in Iraq-Nam in 2009

General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker have a plan for the war in Iraq-Nam that is, according to the general’s official spokesman, still in the final editing stages. The “Joint Campaign Plan” in the words of the Associated Press, “envisions establishing security at the local level in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq by summer 2008, leading one year later to security conditions nationwide that Iraqi forces are capable of sustaining.” In other words, the plan is to hand over to the Iraq-Namese in the summer of 2009 and to have GIs dying at least until then.

Again relying on the AP, “The plan envisions using locally based security initiatives, such as those that in western Anbar province have proven successful in reducing insurgent violence this year, as a starting point. Such efforts are now under way elsewhere in Iraq, including some parts of Baghdad. That approach, it is hoped, will encourage movement at the national level to achieve political reconciliation, which is the ultimate objective.” One is always worried when military men use the word “hope.” It isn't much of a strategy if one of its ingredients is “hope.”

The “Joint Campaign Plan” clearly derives its name from the belief that jointly the military and diplomatic corps, the Americans and the Green Zone government can establish higher levels of security long enough for a political settlement and peace to take root in Baghdad and elsewhere. That, of course, presupposes that a political settlement is something the three main communities in Iraq-Nam will accept. There is precious little evidence for that presupposition.

According to Thomas Fingar, the chairman of the National Intelligence Council, and as reported in this journal, “[E]ven if violence is diminished, given the current winner-take-all attitude and sectarian animosities infecting the political scene, Iraqi leaders will be hard pressed to achieve sustained political reconciliation.” Also, “With political reconciliation showing few appreciable gains, we have noted that Iraqis increasingly resort to violence. The struggle among and within Iraqi communities over national identity and the distribution of power has eclipsed attacks by Iraqis against the Coalition Forces as the greatest impediment to Iraq’s future as a peaceful, democratic, and unified state.”

The problem, at the end of the day, is that the Iraq-Namese want something different for their nation than the Americans do. America has said it wants a democratic, secular, united nation in Mesopotamia. Fewer than 1 Iraq-Namese in 10 wants what Mr. Bush wants for Iraq-Nam, though. Based on the election results that put Mr. al-Maliki in the prime minister’s job, 55% of the Iraq-Namese wants a Shi’ite theocracy, 20% wants an independent Kurdistan, and a similar 20% wants a Sunni religious state. These desires are mutually exclusive, and as such there is no political settlement that Washington will find acceptable. The only question is how many GIs need to die before US policy acknowledges that reality?

© Copyright 2007 by The Kensington Review, Jeff Myhre, PhD, Editor. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written consent. Produced using Fedora Linux.

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