Battle of Basra Shows Green Zone Government’s Weakness

Now that the dust has settled, the Iranian brokered cease-fire is holding and the Pentagon is claiming they really hadn’t been told about the attack in detail, it’s time for an after-action look at the Battle of Basra fought last week. The fight shows that the followers of Moqtada al-Sadr are tougher than Baghdad thought. It also shows that the Green Zone Government is impetuous at best. Above all, it shows that many Iraq-Namese will not fight for the al-Maliki government.

First, the Sadrists were told to lay down their arms and behave. Their response would have done Leonidas of Sparta proud, “Come take them” (molon labe, for those with a classical bent). The cease-fire brokered by Iran left the Sadrists with their weapons, and with a few heavy bits of equipment surrendered by the Basra police and the army. The true measure of Hojatoleslam al-Sadr will come on Wednesday of next week. He has called for a “Million Muslim March” in the city of Najaf to protest the US occupation. The day is the fifth anniversary of the fall of Baghdad.

Second, the government of Nouri al-Maliki didn’t seem to plan the battle out well. Reports are Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker first learned of the Iraq-Namese plan on Friday, March 21. Given that the US does logistics and intelligence for the Green Zone Government, this was rather short notice. One official in the multinational force in Baghdad who requested anonymity told the media Mr. al-Maliki, “went in with a stick and he poked a hornet’s nest, and the resistance he got was a little bit more than he bargained for. They went in with 70 percent of a plan. Sometimes that’s enough. This time it wasn’t.” Rather like their occupiers’ post-war plan for their country.

Third, there is insufficient motivation among the Iraq-Namese army to die for the Green Zone government. US military spokesman General Kevin Bergner spun it as best he could in a news conference in Baghdad, “Overall, the majority of the Iraqi security forces performed their mission. Some were not up to the task and the government of Iraq is taking the necessary action in those cases.”

Finally, in discussing the Sadrist counterpunch in the capital Brigadier-General Kathum Alwan of the Iraq-Namese army was less circumspect in talking to the Inter Press Service, “This failure takes Iraq to point zero and even worse. We must admit that the formation of our forces was wrong, as we saw how our officers deserted their posts, leaving their vehicles for militias. Not a single unit of our army and police stood for their duty in Baghdad, leaving us wondering what to do. Most of the officers who left their posts were members of Badr brigades and the Dawa Party, who should have been most faithful to Maliki’s government.”

Officers deserting their posts, and leaving equipment for the enemy smacks of Saigon 1975. One wonders how General Petreaus and Ambassador Crocker will cover this in their testimony to Congress later this month.

© Copyright 2008 by The Kensington Review, Jeff Myhre, PhD, Editor. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written consent. Produced using Fedora Linux.

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