Becoming the Guerrillas

31 August 2009



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America Must Change Strategy to Win in Afghanistan

The lingering doubt over who won the recent presidential election in Afghanistan makes for decent front page news in the more serious press, but who won is largely irrelevant to US interests. The US went into Afghanistan to root out Al Qaeda and capture or kill Usama bin Laden. Since the fighting began in 2001, the US has experienced mission creep, trying to create a stable, unified Afghanistan under a single government to prevent Al Qaeda and its fellow travelers from ever having a safe haven there again. While a good idea in theory, the objective is too ambitious and borderline impossible. A change in approach could result in improvements in US security with less cost and greater likelihood of success.

Following the Al Qaeda murders of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration actually handled the initial treatment of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan correctly. The US said that if the Taliban handed over Usama bin Laden and his crew, no further action would be necessary. When the Taliban refused, the US backed the Northern Alliance with special forces and weapons to oust the regime. Where things went wrong was in deciding afterwards that building up the government of President Hamid Karzai would permanently solve the problem of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. This shows an appalling ignorance of Afghan demographics and history.

The fact is that Afghanistan is more of a geographical expression than a nation. The mountainous terrain makes travel between its various parts most difficult, and over the centuries, the various ethnic groups who live there have found countless reasons to fight each other. The Pashtun and the Tajik don't get along, the Hazara and the Uzbeks merely complicate things, and the Aimak, Turkmen and Baloch just add to the mix of rivalry. There is no single language, and while most Afghans are Muslim, the Sunni/Shi'ite divide is present with the Sunni enjoying a 3:1 advantage. It is not the kind of place to try nation-building.

Unfortunately, nation-building is precisely what the Bush administration and its NATO allies have been trying to do. The Obama White House appears to want to follow that policy, sending more troops, grinding the Taliban down, and building up the Kabul regime. Replace Taliban with Viet Cong, and Kabul with Saigon, and one gets the feeling of having seen this film before, and it wasn't a good ending.

This journal supports the war in Afghanistan, but not the strategy currently pursued. The US needs only to develop relationships with the various tribes and warlords who can keep America informed of what Al Qaeda in Afghanistan is doing. A few well-placed Navy Seals, Army Rangers and cruise missiles can disrupt anything that begins to threaten the US. The Americans must become the insurgents in Afghanistan fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda by using asymmetric force to their advantage. Currently, the US is trying to defend all of Afghanistan against the Taliban and Al Qaeda when it should be forcing them to defend everything that they hold while striking where and when the US pleases. Every time they build a sand castle, the US needs to kick it over. The US doesn't need to defend the entire beach.

As for the Karzai regime, or if he wins the election that of ex-Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, the US has no compelling interest in propping it up save to prevent a return of the Taliban to Kabul. Who runs Afghanistan is a matter of supreme indifference. Whether it is a base of terrorist activity is not, and the best way to ensure that it isn't such is to move swiftly and violently against such bases and to move out when they are destroyed. Otherwise, the world should leave Afghanistan to the Afghans.

© Copyright 2009 by The Kensington Review, Jeff Myhre, PhD, Editor. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written consent. Produced using Fedora Linux.

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