Cogito Ergo Non Serviam

Iran Deal Rejection Would Make Situation Worse

The main foreign policy debate for the next several weeks in Washington and across America is the Iran nuke deal. Opponents of the agreement, and a minority of opponents have actually read it, say that it isn't strong enough to prevent Iran from building a fission weapon, that rejecting the deal would allow for a "better" treaty to be negotiated. What they fail to realize is that the choice right now is between this arrangement, warts and all, and no limits on Iran's atomic work while the sanctions in place are undermined by Russia and China. The status quo ante is not an option.

Congress has until September 17 to reject the treaty. If it hasn't acted by then, the matter is closed. If it does vote in both houses to reject the treaty on or before that date, President Obama can and will veto the bill. Congress then will have to muster 2/3 majorities in both chambers to prevent the deal from happening. This is per an arrangement the legislative and executive branches made some months ago, and it represents a major strategic win for the White House. Normally, treaties require Senate ratification by a 2/3 majority. However, as this is an agreement pursuant to an existing treaty, namely the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Senate approval is deemed implicit in the ratification of the NNPT. It is the lifting of sanctions to implement the new treaty that requires this vote. Based on the 150 members of the House who signed a letter a few months ago in support of the negotiations, one expects there isn't the necessary majority there to reject the arrangement.

However, a Congress that acted on the facts, rather than one that postures for the voters, would vote to back the treaty to the hilt. The reasons are three-fold. First, it will delay Iran from developing its own nuclear bomb. Second, there isn't a better treaty to be had. Third, the alternative is a worsening of the situation from the American point of view.

To begin with the treaty's efficacy, Iran must part with 98% of its highly enriched fissionables. According to Admiral (res.) Ami Ayalon, the former head of Israeli internal security Shin Bet, "When negotiations began, Iran was two months away from acquiring enough material for a [nuclear] bomb. Now it will be 12 months. He added, "when it comes to Iran's nuclear capability, this [deal] is the best option." Prime Minister Netanyahu may argue otherwise, but he is a politician with an agenda. Admiral Ayalon has no such ax to grind.

The second issue is the misbelief that rejecting the agreement would allow everyone to return to the negotiating table and make improvements. What is much more likely to happen, if the Congress rejects the terms, is the Iranian hardliners (who by the way dislike this deal intensely) will be in a position to veto any future discussion of the matter. If Admiral Ayalon is right that Iran will have the needed fissionables in 2 months' time, rejection of the agreement starts that clock ticking. No new deal can be settled in 2 months, and if Iran possesses enough weapons-grade material for a bomb, that would represent a significant change in the facts. Iran would demand much more in exchange for giving up the uranium and plutonium. That makes any alternate deal automatically worse or unachievable.

Finally, in addition to Iran possessing enough material for a bomb in two months, the sanctions in place will be undermined by Russia and China if the US Congress rejects the deal. Those two governments are not bound by any Congressional action. They have demonstrated a reluctance to continue with the sanctions in place, and they would not take it well if their interests in trading with Iran were suddenly sacrificed by an American Congress. Rejection of the deal would mean that the US and Europe might have sanctions in place against Iran, but Russia and China would probably ignore them. America has pursued a similar policy with regard to Cuba for 50+ years, and it has been an abject failure. In this instance, it would be an American policy failure resulting in a nuclear Iran.

Congress will likely vote against the agreement but be unable to over-ride the president's veto. However, if Congress were not grandstanding, the vote would be close to unanimous in favor of the deal.

© Copyright 2015 by The Kensington Review, Jeff Myhre, PhD, Editor. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written consent. Produced using Ubuntu Linux.



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